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INTRODUCTION
Professor Leonard Riskin developed his controversial grid to
"categorize the various approaches to mediation."1 Consistent with
his pluralistic view, Riskin argues that mediation includes both facil-
itation and evaluation.2 Facilitative mediation occurs where the me-
diator strives to help the parties communicate with one another so
they can resolve their dispute on their own terms. Mediators who use
a facilitative approach "assume that [their] principal mission is to
clarify and to enhance communications between the parties in order
to help them decide what to do."3 Evaluative mediation, by contrast,
occurs where the mediator tries not only to help the parties communi-
cate with one another but also to provide the parties with information
and opinions on the substance of their dispute. Evaluative
mediators, thus, "assume that the participants want and need the
mediator to provide some direction as to the appropriate grounds for
settlement-based on law, industry practice or technology."4
Riskin's categorization of mediation has engendered much de-
bate among academics and practitioners.5 Although most in the me-
diation community accept Riskin's positive assertion that mediation
1. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996) [hereinafter
Riskin, Grid]; see also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Tech-
niques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LInG. 111, 111 (1994) [hereinafter Riskin,
Mediator Orientations].
2. See, e.g., Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 17.
3. Id. at 24.
4. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 1, at 111. To bring the distinction
between facilitative and evaluative mediation into the sharpest possible focus, Riskin
classifies behaviors that fall at the extreme end of each type of practice: "At the ex-
treme of [the] facilitative end," Riskin explains, "is conduct intended simply to allow
the parties to communicate with and understand one another." Riskin, Grid, supra
note 1, at 24. An extreme evaluative mediator, by contrast, engages in "behaviors
intended to direct some or all of the outcomes of the mediation." Id.
5. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discus-
sion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919, 919 (1997) [hereinafter Alfini, Discussion] (noting
that the debate over facilitative and evaluative mediation "is raging in the law re-
views and the literature on dispute resolution"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dis-
pute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1887 (1997) ("The current, most heated debate concerns the ques-
tion whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative or both."); Leonard L. Riskin,
Foreword, 2000 J. Disp. REsOL. 245 (introducing a symposium on the facilitative/
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as currently practiced includes both facilitation and evaluation, 6 a vo-
cal group of purist critics rejects Riskin's pluralist view of mediation
on normative grounds. These purist critics-including such promi-
nent mediator-scholars as Professors Kim Kovach,7 Lela Love," and
evaluative debate); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies:
The Need for Institutionalizing A Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 949, 949-50 (1997) (noting that the facilitative versus evaluative debate is
raging in Florida and nationally) [hereinafter Stempel, Beyond Formalism]; Harry M.
Webne-Behrman, Forum, The Emergence of Ethical Codes and Standards of Practice
in Mediation: The Current State of Affairs, 1998 Wisc. L. REv. 1289, 1299 ("Mediators
are currently engaged in significant professional debates that will impact modes of
practice in the coming generation. Nowhere is this more acute than in the debate
between 'evaluative' and 'facilitative' orientations to mediation."); Should Mediators
Evaluate? A Debate Between Lela P. Love and James B. Boskey, CRanozo ONuNm J.
CONFLICT RESOL. (Dec. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Love/Boskey Debate].
6. Even some of the harshest critics of the normative implications of Riskin's
grid accept its descriptive accuracy. Professors Kim Kovach and Lela Love, for in-
stance, concede that the Riskin Grid is descriptively accurate, see Kimberlee K. Ko-
vach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEaT.
L. REv. 71, 76 (1996) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation], and that reg-
ulatory regimes "mirror[ ] the inclusive picture of mediation offered by the Grid," id.
at 82. See also Kathy Kirk, Mediation Training: What's the Point, Are the Tricks Re.
ally New, and Can an Old Dog Learn?, 37 WAsHBuRN L.J. 637, 643 (1998) (noting that
"in Kansas there are two distinct styles of mediation used: facilitative and
evaluative").
While most appear to accept the descriptive accuracy of the Riskin Grid, some
scholars challenge it. See, e.g., John Lande, How Will Lauwyering and Mediation Prac-
tices Transform Each Other?, 24 FIA. ST. U. L. Rv. 839, 850 n.40 (1997) (contending
that "it is more useful to think of this as a continuum rather than a discrete dichot-
omy"); Stempel, Beyond Formalism, supra note 5, at 952 (arguing that "the view that
mediators act as either facilitators or evaluators represents a triumph of excessively
formalist thinking at a time when effective dispute resolution law and policy require a
functional approach"); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator
Orientations: Piercing the 'Grid'Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rlv. 985, 986 (1997) [herein-
after Stulberg, Piercing] (calling Riskin's "facilitative/evaluative dichotomy" a "false
one").
Others offer alternative models of mediation. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BuSi
& JosEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CoNFucT THROUGH
EMipowEmtErr AND RECOGNITION 28-32 (1994) (distinguishing between "transforma-
tive" and "problem solving" mediators); DEBORAH M. KOLB, TH- ME'roATOms 23-45
(1983) (distinguishing between "orchestrators" and "deal-makers"); James J. Alfini,
Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing it Out: Is This the End of 'Good Mediation?, 19 FA.
ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-73 (1991) (identifying "trashing," "bashing," and "hashing it out"
as three styles of mediation) [hereinafter Alfini, Trashing]; Jeanne M. Brett et al.,
Mediator Style and Mediation Effectiveness, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 277, 280 (1986) (distin-
guishing between deal-making mediators and those who engage in shuttle diplo-
macy); Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HAsTINGs L.J. 703, 707 (1997) (identifying "norm-gener-
ating," "norm-educating," and "norm-advocating" as three models of mediation).
7. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, 'Evaluative'Mediation isan Oxymo-
ron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH CosT LrnG. 31 (1996) [hereinafter Kovach & Love,
Oxymoron]; Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6.
Spring 2001]
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Josh Stulberg 9-argue that mediation is in fact, and should be, solely
a facilitative process "designed to capture the parties' insights, imagi-
nation, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and
shaping their preferred outcomes." 10 For the purists, evaluation has
no place in mediation."
I do not seek in this article to add my voice to the chorus debat-
ing the relative merits of the pluralist and purist approaches to medi-
ation.12 Instead, despite my belief that the pluralists win this debate
as both a positive and normative matter, I intend to imagine for pur-
poses of this article that the purists actually prevail upon state legis-
latures, regulators, mediation trainers, and members of the
mediation community at large to mandate a purely facilitative ap-
proach to mediation. Having successfully conjured up an image of
8. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6; Kovach & Love, Oxy-
moron, supra note 7; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997) [hereinafter Love, Top Ten Reasons];
LoveBoskey Debate, supra note 5 (comments of Lela P. Love).
9. See Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6. Stulberg's critique differs from Kovach
and Love's in that he believes Riskin's "facilitative/evaluative dichotomy is a false one
... " Id. at 986. Nevertheless, he shares their view that mediation should be under-
stood solely as a facilitative process. Id. ("I argue that any orientation that is 'evalua-
tive' as portrayed on the Riskin grid is conduct that is both conceptually different
from, and operationally inconsistent with, the values and goals characteristically
ascribed to the mediation process.").
10. Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6, at 1001.
11. See generally sources cited supra notes 7-9.
12. See sources cited supra notes 7-9; see also Maijorie Corman Aaron, ADR Tool-
box: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62, 62
(1996) (identifying "strategies mediators can use to reduce the risks of evaluation");
Alfini, Discussion, supra note 5 (moderating a debate involving Donna Gebhart, Lela
Love, Cheryl McDonald, Robert Moberly, Javier Perez-Abreu, Kathy Reuter, Carmen
Stein, Jeff Stempel, and Lawrence Watson on the relative merits of evaluative and
facilitative mediation); Alfini, Trashing, supra note 6; John Bickerman, Evaluative
Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LING. 70 (1996) (responding to
Kovach and Love); Dwight Golann & Marjorie Corman Aaron, Using Evaluations in
Mediation, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 26, 26 (1997) (attributing to others the argument that
"[elvaluation is a legitimate weapon in the mediator's arsenal"); Robert B. Moberly,
Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical For Mediators To Evaluate Or Advise?, 38 S. TEx. L.
REV. 669, 678 (1997) (arguing "against ethical rules that prohibit mediator evalua-
tion"); James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Ques-
tions and Tentative Proposals, From An Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEx. L.
REV. 769 (explaining how and when it is appropriate to offer an evaluation); Stempel,
Beyond Formalism, supra note 5, at 950 (endorsing "flexible mediation that permits
judicious use of evaluative techniques" and arguing that "[clonceptual oversimplifica-
tion occurs when the debate is cast in the wooden form of evaluation versus facilita-
tion"); Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-And Of Mediator
Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, (1997) (advocating activist or evaluative
mediation).
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this purely facilitative mediation world, I then seek to make the im-
pertinent claim that mediation is highly unlikely to be a purely
facilitative process as long as lawyers serve as mediators.
This claim rests on two intuitions, one about lawyers and the
other about non-lawyers' perceptions of lawyers. My first intuition is
that lawyers are unlikely to possess the personalities, predisposi-
tions, skills, and training necessary to mediate in a purely facilita-
tive, non-evaluative way. The facilitative mediator, according to the
purists, aims to reorient parties toward one another, to listen care-
fully, to help the parties communicate, to attend to emotions and re-
lationship issues, and to avoid opining based on law.13 The
professionals who seem best-suited to mediate according to the purist
model are psychotherapists, social workers, school counselors, clergy,
and others who are inclined toward, and thoroughly trained in, the
use of such skills. In contrast, lawyers-who tend to be better speak-
ers than listeners, better thinkers than feelers, and better advisors
than counselors-operate according to a "standard philosophical
map"14 that compromises their ability to function successfully as
purely facilitative mediators.
My second intuition is that disputants perceive lawyers and non-
lawyers differently. They imagine that lawyers possess greater
knowledge of the law and legal system, less emotional and interper-
sonal sensitivity, and lower ethical standards than other profession-
als who might serve as mediators. This means, in turn, that
disputants are likely to perceive facilitative behavior on the part of
lawyer-mediators differently than identical behavior on the part of
non-lawyer-mediators. Suppose, for instance, that a mediator asks a
plaintiff in a personal injury case the following facilitative question:
"Can you describe what your life has been like since the accident?"
Disputants are likely to ascribe different connotations to this ques-
tion-even if it is phrased the same way, spoken in the same tone,
and accompanied by identical body language-depending upon the
professional background of the mediator. If the mediator is a psycho-
therapist, for instance, disputants are likely to perceive that the me-
diator is asking the question out of genuine interest in the plaintiffs
feelings. If the mediator is a lawyer, the disputants are more likely to
suspect that the mediator is asking primarily to get a sense of the
money damages appropriate to the case. Disputants, in short, are
likely to share a "standard perceptual map" that predisposes them to
13. See generally infra Part I.
14. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lauwers, 43 OMo ST. L.J. 29, 43-44
(1982) [hereinafter Riskin, Philosophical Map].
Spring 2001]
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view lawyer-mediators as evaluative rather than facilitative dispute
resolvers.
There is a growing body of empirical evidence on the lawyer's
philosophical map and the non-lawyer's perceptual map. Drawing
from that evidence, and from what can reasonably be inferred from it,
I argue in this article that mediation is unlikely to be purely facilita-
tive as long as lawyers serve as mediators. I begin in Part I by
describing the purist approach to mediation. In Part II, I use availa-
ble empirical evidence as well as a mediation hypothetical to develop
my argument that lawyer-mediators compromise purely facilitative
mediation. Finally, I conclude in Part III by briefly considering some
of the implications of this argument for lawyering. Specifically, I ex-
plore whether lawyers can-and whether they should-behave
differently.
I. Tm PURIST VIEW OF MEDIATION
Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party helps
others resolve a dispute.15 Mediation differs from litigation, as well
as arbitration and many other dispute resolution processes, in that
the mediator, in contrast to a judge or arbitrator, is not authorized to
impose a decision. 16 Rather, the mediator is authorized only to aid
the parties in developing their own agreements. 17 Mediation, in
short, is "facilitated negotiation,"' 8 and the mediator is the negotia-
tion facilitator.
While the purists acknowledge that a range of facilitative and
evaluative activities currently fall under this generally accepted defi-
nition of mediation, 19 they reject this inclusive conception of media-
tion on normative grounds. For the purists, mediation must be a
purely facilitative, non-evaluative process in which "parties are
taught how to resolve their own disputes, listen to each other differ-
ently, broaden their own capacities for understanding and collabora-
tion, and create resolutions that build relationships, generate more
harmony, and are 'win-win.'"
20
Because the purists view mediation as a purely facilitative pro-
cess, the purists expect the mediator to behave in a purely facilitative
15. See Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 7.
16. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DIspuTE RESOLUTION
AND LAWYERS 313 (2d ed. 1997).
17. Id.
18. See Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 13.
19. See supra note 6.
20. Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 943-44.
[Vol. 6:145
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way. To do so, the facilitative mediator assists "disputing parties in
making their own decisions and evaluating their own situations."21
Through the careful deployment of communication skills, information
gathering and organizing skills, and "counseling and calming
skills," 22 the facilitative mediator may "push disputing parties to
question their assumptions, reconsider their positions, and listen to
each other's perspectives, stories, and arguments" and may "urge the
parties to consider relevant law, weigh their own values, principles,
and priorities, and develop an optimal outcome."-  The facilitative
mediator may not, however, offer "an opinion or judgment as to the
likely court outcome or a 'fair' or correct resolution of an issue in a
dispute."24
The purists prescribe mediator facilitation and proscribe media-
tor evaluation for three primary reasons. First, the purists argue
that mediation "should stand as a distinct and clear-cut alternative
to the evaluative and frequently highly adversarial processes that
lawyers know best."2 5 The civil litigation system rests on an adver-
sarial paradigm, which posits that the "truth" of a dispute emerges
through the presentation of competing positions to a judge or jury
empowered to decide by applying rules of law to the "facts" asserted
by the disputants.26 Like litigation, such familiar "alternative" dis-
pute resolution processes as arbitration 27 and "rent a judge" proce-
dures28 are premised on the adversarial paradigm. Because
disputants can participate in any number of adversarial, evaluative
dispute resolution processes, the purists argue that "[wle need a gen-
uine alternative to the adversarial paradigm of disputants who fight
and a neutral who assesses."29 That alternative, claim the purists, is
a purely facilitative, non-evaluative mediation process.
21. Id. at 939.
22. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLEs AND PRAcTcE 36 (1994).
23. Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 939.
24. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 80.
25. Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 32.
26. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in Txs oN ArIlrucAN L.%w
34-36 (Harold J. Berman ed., 2d. ed. 1971).
27. "[Alrbitration typically contains the essential elements of court adjudication:
proofs and arguments are submitted to a neutral third party who has the power to
issue a binding decision." STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DispuTr RSOLUTIoN: NEGO-
TIATION, MEDIATION, AN OTHER PROCESSES 199 (2d ed. 1992).
28. See generally Barlow F. Christensen, Private Justice: California's General
Reference Procedure, 1982 Amt. B. FouND. RES. J. 79 (describing California's "rent a
judge" procedure).
29. Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 943; see also id. at 944 ("In the corpo-
rate world, phalanges of consultants assist in promoting creative problem-solving and
building teams capable of successful collaboration. Similarly, the legal community
Spring 2001]
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Second, the purists argue that evaluation undermines party self-
determination, which they see as "the fundamental goal of media-
tion."30 They contend that evaluative behavior undermines party
self-determination because the mediator's words and actions have a
profound impact on the parties' ability to exercise their self-determi-
nation. "The truth is that we never know what happens when we
utter something," Love argues. "We never know the weight it has
with people." 31 Specifically, mediator evaluations may redirect the
needs a model from among the array of dispute resolution processes that will assist
parties to evolve in their understandings, relationships, and arrangements, using the
opportunity represented by conflict situations."); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Ko-
vach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J.
Disp. RESOL. 295, 306 ("Should the mediation process become engulfed by the adver-
sarial paradigm now, disputants will be robbed of one of the richest opportunities to
experience collaborative approaches to problem solving and dispute resolution.");
Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6, at 988 (noting that the critics of the Riskin Grid
"maintain that evaluative activity by a mediator distorts the distinctive attributes of
the mediation process ...").
30. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 88 (identifying
"voluntary self-determination by parties" as "the fundamental goal of mediation"); Ko-
vach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 32 (identifying "promoting self-determina-
tion of parties and helping the parties examine their real interest and develop
mutually acceptable solutions" as the "primary objectives of mediation"). The purists
rely in part on the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators to support their conten-
tion that party autonomy is the primary goal of mediation. See, e.g., Kovach & Love,
Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 31 ("The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, re-
cently promulgated by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, are at odds with
'evaluative mediation.' These standards say that the principle of self-determination is
central to the mediation process and prohibit a mediator from providing professional
advice."); Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 940-41 ('The Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators highlight party self-determination as being the fundamental
principle of mediation. The committee that created the Model Standards rejected me-
diation as an evaluative process.").
31. Alfini, Discussion, supra note 5, at 933-34 (quoting Lela Love); see also id. at
930 (quoting Donna Gebhart) ("I believe very strongly that when, or if, I evaluate the
case, because they [i.e., parties] generally value what I say, it will affect their deci-
sion. They may be settling for something that they wouldn't really be happy with.");
Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 100 ("The exact impact of ac-
tions and words is unknowable. If a precondition to giving an evaluation is determin-
ing that an evaluation will be 'non-directive' or will not interfere with self-
determination, the safest and wisest course is to give no evaluation at all."); Love, Top
Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 943 (noting, for example, that "[tihe mediator's opinion
that one of the parties should buy a carpet to lessen the impact of sounds heard by a
neighbor or that one of the parties does not have standing to bring a particular claim
in court carries enormous weight."). In short, the purists believe evaluative media-
tion undermines party autonomy because they overestimate mediators and underesti-
mate parties. The purists claim to have a great deal of respect for parties embroiled
in disputes. They claim that they perceive parties to "have the resources and creative
capacity to resolve their own disputes better-and differently-than an arbitrator or a
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parties from each other to the mediator,32 lock parties into adver-
sarial negotiation positions,33 prevent parties from sharing informa-
tion with one another,34 and stop parties from engaging in creative
problem-solving.35 In short, mediator evaluation may prevent par-
ties from "craft[ing] outcomes for themselves."36
Third, the purists advocate a purely facilitative, non-evaluative
approach because they believe evaluation threatens the neutrality of
the mediation process. Neutrality, which "is deeply imbedded in the
ethos of mediation,"37 promotes parties' confidence and trust in the
process, 38 encourages parties to share information with one an-
other,3 9 and plays a part in producing high levels of party satisfac-
tion.40 The purists contend that evaluation threatens the neutrality
judge would," see Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 32, yet they believe
these parties will wilt in the face of a mediator's expression of her opinion.
32. See e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 99 ("If the
neutral assumes an evaluative role or orientation, the parties' focus during the pro-
cess shifts towards influencing the neutral decision-maker and away from crafting
outcomes for themselves.").
33. See, e.g., id. at 100 ("Evaluation inhibits or eliminates party participation
when it undermines one party's negotiation position and, conversely, locks another
party into a particular posture.").
34. See, e.g., id. at 102 ("If the mediator ultimately provides an evaluation, the
mediator can expect to elicit only information like that shared in an adversarial pro-
cess, especially if the parties are sophisticated. Accordingly, the evaluative mediator
is handicapped in building an information base upon which more optimal, 'win-win'
solutions might develop.").
35. See, e.g., id. at 103 ("An evaluative orientation on the part of the neutral
tends to replicate the adversarial process and place the parties in an adversarial
mode. The resulting defensive and offensive postures of the parties inhibit collabom-
tion and creativity.").
36. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 99; see also id. at 102-03
(arguing that mediators "must embrace a facilitative orientation to assist the parties
in generating a truly self-determined outcome").
37. Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 47.
38. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 101 (connect-
ing mediator neutrality and "the trust of parties").
39. See, e.g., id. at 101-02 ("Mediators enhance the informational environment-
both in terms of the quantity and the reliability of the information-by using as in-
ducements for openness their own neutrality and the benefits of a mutually advanta-
geous or 'win-win' outcome.").
40. See, e.g., Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of
the Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L.
REv. 885, 923 (1997) (reporting based on a review of empirical studies that the "per-
ceived neutral role of the mediator" enhances party "perceptions of the legitimacy of
the dispute resolution process"); Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A 'Parky Satisfaction'
Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHio ST. J. oN4 Disp. RESOL.
885, 893 (1998) (noting that party satisfaction with the mediation process is enhanced
when it is "unbiased"); Nina R. Meierding, Does Mediation Work? A Survey of Long-
Term Satisfaction and Durability Rates for Privately Mediated Agreements, 11 MEDIA-
TiON Q. 157, 163, 170 (1990) (finding "a high level of satisfaction" among parties to
Spring 2001] 153
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of the mediation process because any evaluation "invariably favors
one side over the other."41 When a mediator offers an opinion favor-
ing one party, that opinion can have deleterious consequences. The
advantaged party "may get locked into an unacceptable claim or posi-
tion and negotiations may stop altogether."42 The disadvantaged
party, by contrast, "is likely to withdraw from the mediation, believ-
ing that the mediator has 'sided' with the other party."43 Only by
steadfastly refusing to evaluate can a mediator "encourage parties to
examine and articulate underlying interests; recognize common in-
terests and complementary goals; and engage in creative problem-
solving to find resolutions acceptable and optimal for all parties."
44
In sum, the purists believe that evaluation is "conceptually dif-
ferent from and operationally inconsistent with, the values and
goals" of facilitative mediation. 45 Evaluators and facilitators use "dif-
ferent skills and techniques" and possess "different competencies,
training norms, and ethical guidelines to perform their respective
functions."46 Because of the fundamental differences between facili-
tation and evaluation, the purists contend that mediation must be a
purely facilitative, non-evaluative process that "reorient[s] the par-
ties towards each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by help-
ing them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitude and dispo-
sitions toward one another."47
mediation in which the vast majority of them felt the mediator was "unbiased"); Jo-
seph P. Tomain & Jo Anne Lutz, A Model for Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 OHIo ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 16 (1989) (attributing party satisfaction with court-annexed media-
tion in part to "unbiased" mediators); Mary P. Van Hook, Resolving Conflict Between
Farmers and Creditors: An Analysis of the Farmer-Creditor Mediation Process, 8 ME.
DIATION Q. 63, 70 (1990) (finding that impartiality is an important part of successful
farmer-creditor mediation).
41. Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 31; see also Love, Top Ten Rea-
sons, supra note 8, at 939 (arguing that evaluation "can compromise the mediator's
neutrality-both in actuality and in the eyes of the parties-because the mediator
will be favoring one side in his or her judgment").
42. Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 945.
43. Id. at 945; see also Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 101
("To the extent that a mediator's evaluation favors or disfavors a party or seems
wrong to a party, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the mediation.").
44. Kovach & Love, Oxymoron, supra note 7, at 31.
45. Stulberg, Piercing, supra note 6, at 986.
46. Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 939; see also Kovach & Love, Map-
ping Mediation, supra note 6, at 109 (noting that evaluative and facilitative media-
tion assume "different qualifications, skills, and tasks").
47. Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. RE.v. 305, 325
(1971).
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II. LA'WYER-MEDIATOR FACILITATION
The presence of lawyer-mediators compromises the purely
facilitative mediation process envisioned by the purists in two ways.
First, lawyers seldom have the personalities and skills necessary to
mediate in a purely facilitative way. Second, disputants are likely to
perceive lawyer-mediators as evaluative even when they are exhibit-
ing facilitative behaviors. Empirical evidence, though certainly not
conclusive, provides some support for both propositions.
A. The Lawyer's Standard Philosophical Map
Professor Riskin observed nearly two decades ago that most law-
yers operate according to a "standard philosophical map" which rests
on the twin assumptions that disputants are adversaries and that
disputes should be resolved according to the application of law to
fact.48 Because lawyers rely on this philosophical map, they are in-
clined to behave in an evaluative fashion. Lawyers "put people and
events into categories that are legally meaningful,"49 "think in terms
of rights and duties established by rules,"50 and "focus on acts more
than persons."-5 To do this, lawyers exercise formidable cognitive
skills but are often plagued by an "under-cultivation of emotional fac-
ulties."52 This underdevelopment of emotional faculties makes it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, for lawyers to do what facilitative mediators
must-"be aware of the many interconnections between and among
disputants and others,"53 appreciate "the qualities of these connec-
tions,"54 and "be sensitive to emotional needs of all parties."55 In
sum, Riskin observed, "[tihe philosophical map employed by most
48. Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 43-44. In a recent reflection,
Professor Jim Coben argues that the lawyers' standard philosophical map also in-
cludes "the notion of law as the exclusive measure of fairness and equity, the assump-
tion that justice is done within the adversarial system when the zealous advocate
vigorously represents her clients' interests without regard to other's interests, and the
idea that a duty exists to zealously exploit rules and processes to aid the client."
James R. Coben, Summer Musings on Curricular Innovations to Change the Lauyer's
Standard Philosophical Map, 50 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 735, 737 (1998).
49. Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 45.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id, see also Beryl Blaustone, To Be Of Service: The Lauer's Aware Use of The
Human Skills Associated With The Perceptive Self, 15 J. LEGAL PROF. 241, 243 (1990)
("[Flew lawyers are intrapersonally developed; that is, few are self-aware of their own
behavioral preferences, modes of communication, values, and sense of self.").
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practicing lawyers and law teachers .. .differs radically from that
which a mediator must use."5 6
Riskin's observations about lawyers appear to be supported by a
fairly sizeable body of research on lawyers and law students. 57 Con-
sistent with Riskin's observations, researchers have found that law-
yers approach the world with "a cognitive and rational outlook,"
8
possess relatively underdeveloped emotional and interpersonal facul-
ties, and tend toward an adversarial orientation. These characteris-
tics, in turn, make it unlikely that lawyer-mediators can sustain
purely facilitative behavior in mediation.
1. Analytical Acumen
Most lawyers, perhaps by personality as well as by training and
practice, approach the world in an abstract, analytical way. Lawyers
are deemed so rational and analytical, in fact, that "brain researchers
have selected lawyers when they wished to test an occupational
group that is characteristically analytical in its preferred mode of
thought."59
Scholars using a variety of methodologies have demonstrated
that lawyers are analytically inclined. Researchers using a brain-
dominance testing instrument, for instance, have found that nearly
90% of lawyers are "left-brain dominant," indicating an analytical ori-
entation.60 Researchers have also used the Myers-Briggs Type Indi-
cator (MBTI) to assess lawyers' personalities. The MBTI, which is
56. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). According to Riskin, the mediator's philosophical
map rests on the twin assumptions that "all parties can benefit through a creative
solution to which each agrees" and that each "situation is unique and therefore not to
be governed by any general principle except to the extent that the parties accept it."
Id. at 44.
57. For a more comprehensive treatment, see Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thy-
self A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professional-
ism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337 (1997) [hereinafter Daicoff, Know Thysel]; see also Susan
Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique
of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived At.
torney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 547 (1998) [hereinafter Da-
icoff, Changing Spots].
58. Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 45.
59. Graham B. Strong, The Lawyer's Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the
Practice of Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 759, 761 (1998) (citing to Stephen Arndt & Dale
E. Berger, Cognitive Mode and Asymmetry in Cerebral Functioning, 14 CORTEX 78, 82-
84 (1978) and Robert E. Ornstein, The Split and the Whole Brain, HuAtr NATuaE,
May 1978, at 76, 78).
60. See Strong, supra note 59, at 761-62 n.14 (citing to Cynthia Kelly & Bernice
McCarthy, Presentation at the Annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools (Jan. 4, 1985)).
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based on Jungian psychology, measures four dimensions of personal-
ity, including whether one is inclined toward "thinking" or "feeling."61
Thinkers "make decisions more analytically and impersonally" than
Feelers. 62 "When making decisions, they place more value on consis-
tency and fairness than on how others will be affected. They look for
flaws and fallacies, excelling at critiquing conclusions and pinpoint-
ing what is wrong with something."63 Researchers from the 1960s to
the 1990s have found that lawyers are substantially more inclined
toward the "thinking" orientation than the population as a whole.
64
Lawyers, in short, "tend to be more logical, unemotional, rational,
and objective" 65 than others and place a "great emphasis on logic,
thinking, rationality, justice, fairness, rights, and rules."
66
61. RENEE BARON, WHAT TYPE A I? 5 (1998).
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id; see also Larry Richard, The Lawyer Types, 79 A.B.A. J. 74,76 (July 1993)
("Thinkers make decisions in a detached, objective and logical manner. They employ
syllogistic thinking, and make a conscious effort not to let their personal preferences
get in the way of making a right' decision. Feelers, on the other hand, prefer to make
decisions by using a more personal, subjective and values-based approach.").
64. In 1967, Paul VanR. Miller, who administered the MBTI to first-year stu-
dents from four law schools and a control group of liberal arts undergraduates, found
that "72% of the law students were Thinking' types whereas 54% of the liberal arts
undergraduates were Thinkers.'" Paul VanR. Miller, Personality Differences and
Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. LEGAL EDuC. 460, 465 (1967). Nearly two de-
cades later, Gerald Macdaid and colleagues found that 74.6% of recent male law
school graduates and 64.9% of primarily-male practicing lawyers preferred "thinking"
to "feeling" on the MBTI. Strong, supra note 59, at 762 n.14 (citing to GERALD P.
MAcDAID ET AL., MYERs-BRiGs TYPE INDICATOR ATLAS OF TYPE TABLus 311-12 tbls.
8623162 & 8629439 (1986)). More recent research supports these findings. Don Pe-
ters found that nearly 80% of the more than 600 University of Florida law students
who took the MBTI in the 1980s preferred the thinking orientation. Don Peters, For-
ever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Learning
Negotiation, 42 DRAxE L. REv. 1, 17 (1993). Vernellia Randall found that 77.9- of
entering law students preferred the thinking orientation to the feeling orientation.
Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and
Performance, 26 Cuim. L. REv. 63, 91 (1995). Larry Richard found in his large study
of practicing lawyers that "fully 81 percent of male lawyers preferred thinking, as did
66 percent of female lawyers." Richard, supra note 63, at 76. See also THo:,tAs L.
SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOtNT, LAWYERS, LAw STUDENTS AND PE:OPL 94-95 (1977)
(using the 16PF "personality factors" test to find that law students, law faculty, and
law alumni are "more 'tough-minded' than other people are"); Frank L. Natter, The
Human Factor: Psychological Type in Legal Education, 24 Rus. PSYCHOL. TYPE 24, 24
(1981) (finding in a pilot study of 28 law students that 63% of them preferred the
"thinking" orientation on the MBTI); Don Peters & Martha M. Peters, Maybe That's
Why I Do That: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and
Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y. L. SCR. L. REv. 169, 181 n.43 (1990) (finding in
a pilot study of 23 law students enrolled in a legal clinic that more than 60% of them
preferred the "thinking" orientation on the MBTD.
65. See Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1405.
66. Id.
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2. Emotional Unintelligence
Lawyers' analytical tools give them "enormous power,"67 al-
lowing them "to generalize on the basis of diverse facts (working to
abstraction from the bottom up)" and "to apply an existing legal rule
or factual generalization to a new set of facts (working through ab-
straction from the top down)."68 As a result, lawyers can successfully
perform the critical task of translating "the complex and undefined
difficulties presented by a client into a problem of a known type that
can be reduced to puzzle form and attacked by the use of a familiar
set of rules."69 Unfortunately, however, lawyers' analytical prowess
is "purchased at the price of a loss of concrete information" because
abstract analysis necessarily reduces complexity.70 When informa-
tion is too complex or too subtle to lend itself to abstract reduction,
lawyers often have difficulty understanding, interpreting, and work-
ing with such information. 71 One task that requires "a gestalt appre-
ciation of an unedited set of concrete data, rather than abstract
analytical reduction," is the "recognition and interpretation of subtle
displays of emotion."
72
For all their analytical skills, most lawyers seem fairly uninter-
ested in, and unskilled at, dealing with emotional and interpersonal
content.73 Researchers using the MBTI, for example, have found not
only that lawyers are more inclined toward the "thinking" orientation
than the population as a whole, 74 but also that lawyers are substan-
tially less inclined toward the "feeling" orientationJ 5 Feelers "make
decisions more subjectively [than Thinkers], according to their values
or what is more important to them. They also place greater emphasis
on how other people will be affected by their choices and actions ....
It is possible for them to decide whether something is acceptable or




71. Id. at 776-77.
72. Id. at 777.
73. In Howard Gardner's terms, lawyers may possess relatively high levels of
"logical-mathematical" and "linguistic" intelligence, but they tend not to possess such
high levels of the "personal" intelligences, HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: TIlE
THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 73-98, 128-69, 237-76 (1983), especially "the
ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals and, in particular,
among their moods, temperaments, motivations, and intentions." Id. at 239.
74. See supra text accompanying note 64.
75. See supra text accompanying note 64. Of course, given the scoring of the
MBTI, high scores on "thinking" necessarily mean low scores on "feeling."
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agreeable without needing logical reasons."76 Professors John Barkai
and Virginia Fine administered the Truax Accurate Empathy Scale
to law students and found that even after undergoing empathy train-
ing, law students obtained an average score below Level Five on the
scale, "the minimum level of facilitative interpersonal functioning."
77
Professor G. Andrew Benjamin and his colleagues, who undertook a
comprehensive study of the mental health and well-being of law stu-
dents and lawyers, found elevated levels of mental distress78 and
speculated that this could be due to the "[ulnbalanced development of
[law] student interpersonal skills."79 Professor James Hedegard, in
his study of BYU law students found "drops in sociability and, more
generally, interest in people" during the first year of law school.80
And Professor Sandra Janoff, who studied the moral reasoning of law
students before and after the first year of law school, found that law
students became less "caring" during their first year of formal legal
education.8 '
On balance, this research suggests that lawyers are "less inter-
ested in people, in emotions, and interpersonal concerns" than
76. BARON, supra note 61, at 27.
77. John L. Barkai & Virginia 0. Fine, Empathy Training for Lauyers and Law
Students, 13 Sw. U. L. REv. 505, 526 (1983). Prior to the empathy training, the exper-
imental group obtained an average score of 2.46, while the control group scored 2.16,
both on a seven-point scale. Id. at 526 n.63. Following the four-hour empathy train-
ing, the experimental group (which received the empathy training) scored 4.91, while
the control group (which obviously did not receive the empathy training) scored 1.39.
Id. at 526 n.64.
78. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psy.
chological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 Az. B. FOuND. REs. J.
225, 247 ("[Oin the basis of epidemiological data, only 3-9% of individuals in indus-
trial nations suffer from depression; prelaw subject group means did not differ from
normative expectations. Yet, 17-40% of law students and alumni in our study suf-
fered from depression, while 20-40% of the same subjects suffered from other elevated
symptoms.") (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 250. Benjamin et al. explain "[clonventional legal education that con-
centrates on the development of analytic skills while ignoring interpersonal develop-
ment may increase distress levels and prevent the alleviation of symptoms," id, and
identify excessive workloads and high student-faculty ratios as other potential causes
of elevated mental distress, id. at 248-49.
80. James M. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In.Depth Examina-
tion of Career-Relevant Interests, Attitudes, and Personality Traits Among First-Year
Law Students, 1979 Aai. B. FoUND. RES. J. 791, 835.
81. Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76
MlqN. L. REv. 193, 229 (1991).
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others. 82 In fact, the research "suggests that humanistic, people-ori-
ented individuals do not fare well, psychologically or academically, in
law school or in the legal profession."
8 3
3. Adversarial Orientation
Whether because of their innate personalities, their legal train-
ing, the realities of law practice, or some combination thereof, law-
yers tend to mirror the adversarial system. Research shows that
lawyers are competitive and aggressive8 4 and that they perceive the
world in rule-based, law-and-order, rights-oriented terms. Lawyers
tend to operate, in other words, on the assumption that society can
best resolve its disputes through the aggressive application of rules to
facts.
Researchers using different theoretical frameworks have found
that lawyers are disproportionately oriented to an adversarial
worldview. Professor Lawrence Landwehr, for instance, assessed
lawyers using a test instrument derived from Professor Lawrence
Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning and development.8 5 Kohlberg's
82. Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1405.
83. Id; see also Richard, supra note 63, at 76 ("Feelers have a rough time of it [in
the legal profession] .... The constant adversarial mentality wears on the feeler,
while for the thinker it can represent one of the most stimulating parts of practice.").
Interestingly, in her study of law students, dental students, and social work students,
Barbara Nachman found that "[riegard for feelings of others as an aim of discipline,
concern for human suffering as an ethic instilled in the children, and appeal to consid-
eration for others as a method of discipline ('you will make mother feel bad') was [sic]
more frequently reported by social workers than by the other two groups." Barbara
Nachmann, Childhood Experience and Vocational Choice in Law, Dentistry, and So-
cial Work, 7 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 243, 249 (1960).
84. See, e.g., Martin J. Bohn, Jr., Psychological Needs of Engineering, Pre-Law,
Pre-Medical, and Undecided College Freshmen, 12 J.C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 359, 361
(1971) (finding in a "psychological need" study that lawyers were "perceived a having
some definite need requirements, such as the needs to be a leader, to attract atten-
tion, and to avoid feeling inferior or taking a subordinate role"); John M. Houston et
al., Assessing Competitiveness: A Validation Study of the Competitiveness Index, 13
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1153 (1992) (confirming that lawyers are
more competitive than nurses); Janet S. St. Lawrence et al., Stress Management
Training for Law Students: Cognitive-Behavioral Intervention, 1 BEHAVIORAL Sci. &
LAW 101, 106 (1983) (noting law students' "competitive approach to life"); Sue Winkle
Williams & John C. McCullers, Personal Factors Related to Typicalness of Career and
Success in Active Professional Women, 7 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 343, 354 (1983) (specu-
lating that "achievement in law may be associated with the traditionally masculine
characteristics of aggressiveness and competitiveness").
85. Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The
Law and Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 39 (1982).
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theory, 86 which has been called "the most widely accepted theory
describing how individuals develop their capacity to reason as moral
agents," 7 posits that there are six stages of moral reasoning.' s In his
assessment of nearly 200 lawyers, Landwehr found that more than
90% of lawyers reside at Kohlberg's stage four, while only 30-50% of
the population as a whole is concentrated at that stage.8 9 Stage four
is a "law and order" stage, and those at stage four are inclined toward
"authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order."90
Landwehr found that fewer than three percent of lawyers are at
Kohlberg's stage five, while approximately 25% of the adult popula-
tion as a whole is at that stage. 91 Those at stage five, like those at
stage four, are legalistic in orientation, but they recognize "the rela-
tivism of personal values and opinions" and place "a corresponding
emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus."92 Those at
stage five, in short, are less deferential to established rules and are
more willing to question established frameworks for resolving
disputes. 9
3
86. See generally 1 ANNE COLBY & LAWVRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MlEAsumErm OF
MORAL JuDGrNT (1987).
87. Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teach-
ing, 1 CLnucAL L. Rlv. 505, 506-07 (1995).
88. 1 COLBY & KOHLBERG, supra note 86, at 15-19.
89. Landwehr, supra note 85, at 44. Landwehr speculates that the unusual con-
centration of lawyers at stage four is a consequence of "legal thinking." Id. at 49.
90. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Educa-
tion, 56 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 670, 671 t.1 (1975).
91. Landwehr, supra note 85, at 45.
92. Kohlberg, supra note 90, at 671 t.1.
93. See, e.g., Landwehr, supra note 85, at 46 ("The cognitive structure of a stage 4
person may permit careful scrutiny of whether someone has acted within the civil or
criminal legal rules but the same structure severely inhibits the ability to question
the rules themselves. In contrast, the stage 5 cognitive process is one of questioning
and opting for changing the law when such change is perceived as necessary to
achieve social goals.") (footnote omitted); see also June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine,
Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. Rnv. 1 (1974).
Tapp and Levine developed a "legal socialization and development" model influenced
by Kohlberg's theory. Id at 2, 12. According to their model, individuals engage in
legal reasoning at one of three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconven-
tional. Id. at 2. They developed an open-ended questionnaire designed to assess legal
reasoning according to their model. They then administered their questionnaire to
college students, teachers, prison inmates, and law students, finding that law stu-
dents approach the world in accord with the "law-and-order, conventional level" of
their model. Id. at 22, 25-26. They also found that twice as many prison inmates as
law students (16% to 8%) approach the world in accord with the postconventional
level, id. at 25-26, a level at which "legal directives are not derived from the dictates
of unilateral authority," but rather "are human constructs reflecting the active, con-
sensual participation of equals moving toward shared expectations."
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Challenging the universality of Kohlberg's theory,94 Professor
Carol Gilligan 95 posited that women reason in a "care"-based, rela-
tionship-oriented way, while men are more inclined to reason in an
abstract, "rights"-based way.96 Applying a Gilligan-based assess-
ment instrument to law students, Janoff found that male students
were likely to enter law school with a "rights" orientation, while "wo-
men were more likely to respond to moral dilemmas with a care per-
spective."97 At the end of the first year, however, "there was no
significant difference between the rights orientations of women and
men."9s By the end of the first year, women, like men, "were less
likely to be oriented to the interconnectedness of others. They also
were more likely to regard individuals as separate entities. In addi-
tion, women were more likely to rely on principles for conflict resolu-
tion and to seek reasons for particular behaviors."99 The research
evidence suggests then that "lawyers' approach to problems and val-
ues is significantly more homogeneous and more focused on objective,
rational analysis of rules and codified rights than the general
population." 100
4. Summary
Lawyers are analytically oriented, emotionally and interperson-
ally underdeveloped, and as adversarial as the legal system within
94. "[TIn the research from which Kohlberg derives his theory, females simply do
not exist." Id. at 18. "Kohlberg's six stages that describe the development of moral
judgment from childhood to adulthood are based empirically on a study of eighty-four
boys whose development Kohlberg has followed for a period of over twenty years." Id.
(citations omitted).
95. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
96. See, e.g., id. at 62-63. For a thoughtful philosophical exploration of the "care"
perspective, see NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL
EDUCATION (1984).
97. Janoff, supra note 81, at 218.
98. Id. at 232.
99. Id. at 232-23; see also Janet Taber et al., Project, Gender, Legal Education,
and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Gradu-
ates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1251 (1988) (finding fewer differences than expected be-
tween the moral reasoning of male and female law students and lawyers and
speculating that "[tihe socialization of female law students and graduates into the
traditional 'legal' mode of thinking may explain the fact that women and men did not
differ on any of the abstract factors").
100. Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1397. But see id. at 1409 ('While
there is evidence to suggest that their stage of moral development and decision-mak-
ing styles may be more homogeneous than the general population and more focused
on maintaining rules, regulations, social order, and conformity, there is also evidence
that their stage of moral development does not differ from the moral development of
other similarly educated adults, and that law school has no real effect on their moral
development.") (footnotes omitted).
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which they operate.101 Lawyers' default personality or "philosophical
map" may serve them well when they represent clients in litiga-
tion'0 2 or when they function as neutrals in processes like arbitration
or evaluative mediation, but does it serve them well when they at-
tempt to function as facilitative mediators?
On the one hand, it seems likely that lawyers' analytical skills,
emotional distance, and comfort with a rule-based regime will aid
them in carrying out some of the facilitative mediator's tasks. Law-
yer-mediators, for instance, will likely be able to discern the substan-
tive content conveyed by disputants, identify issues to be discussed,
structure the conversation in a logical and linear fashion, avoid emo-
tional involvement in the dispute, and contemplate a variety of legal
considerations that might potentially aid the parties in reaching
resolution.
On the other hand, it seems likely that lawyers' personalities and
predispositions will preclude them from mediating in a purely
facilitative, non-evaluative way. Lawyers are so analytically in-
clined, for instance, it seems unlikely that they will consistently be
able to exercise the flexibility, creativity, and imagination necessary
to aid parties in resolving their disputes.' 0 3 Lawyers, in other words,
are likely to skillfully exercise "UWudgment, criticism, tough-minded-
ness, and practicality,"10 4 but to the detriment of the imagination,
creativity, and "generation of options and breakthrough ideas"105
necessary in facilitative mediation.'
06
101. See supra Part II.A.1-3.
102. See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psycholog, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 T. L. REv. 77 (1997) (demon-
strating experimentally that lawyers are less likely than their clients to fall prey to
psychological barriers that may impede their clients from accepting economically-ra-
tional settlements). But see Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57, at 1394 (noting that
lawyers' rational, unemotional personalities "might explain why lawyers and their
clients at times have trouble interacting with and relating to each other").
103. See generally Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REv.
551, 611 (1973) (noting that in law school "[i]magination and creativity, supreme
achievements by most educational standards, seemed to have been demoted in favor
of attaining legal tools, vocabulary, and skills of analysis").
104. JAims L. ADAms, CONCEPTUAL BLOCKBusTiNG: A GuIDE To BmTER IDEAs 46
(3d ed. 1986).
105. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 103.
106. Theorists from various disciplines warn of the detrimental impact that judg-
ing and analysis can have on the conceptualization and creative resolution of
problems and disputes. See, e.g., ADnms, supra note 104, at 46 ("Judgment, criticism,
tough-mindedness, and practicality are of course essential in problem-solving. How-
ever, if applied too early or too indiscriminately in the problem-solving process, they
are extremely detrimental to conceptualization."); ROGER FisHEa, Wiu&,.t URY &
BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMtENT WrrHouT GVING IN 58 (2d
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Because lawyers appear to possess relatively underdeveloped
emotional and interpersonal faculties, it seems unlikely that lawyers
will be skilled at actively listening to parties, attending to their ver-
bal and non-verbal cues, picking up on subtle displays of emotion,
and "reorienting" the parties toward one another. 10 7 Lawyers, in
short, are unlikely to "recognize the importance of yearnings for mu-
tual respect, equality, security, and other such non-material interests
as may be present" in the mediation.'
08
Moreover, lawyers tend to be so adversarial, it seems likely that
their mediation behavior will be influenced, even if only subtly, by
their awareness of potentially applicable legal principles and proce-
dures. It seems unlikely, in other words, that lawyers, in contrast to
other professionals with different personalities, skills, and knowl-
edge, will truly be able to mediate outside "the shadow of the law"10 9
and the legal system.
Although the available empirical evidence does not-and could
not-describe how all lawyers behave, it does describe the tendencies
that most lawyers are likely to exhibit. Consistent with Riskin's as-
tute observations, the empirical evidence suggests that most lawyers
are unlikely to be able to sustain purely facilitative, non-evaluative
behavior in mediation.
B. The Disputant's Standard Perceptual Map
Many in the mediation community acknowledge that most law-
yers are not well-suited to mediate in a purely facilitative, non-evalu-
ative way. Riskin, for instance, observed that "most lawyers, most of
the time" operate according to the lawyer's standard philosophical
map, rather than the mediator's philosophical map. 0 Even Kovach
ed. 1991) ("Nothing is so harmful to inventing as a critical sense waiting to pounce on
the drawbacks of any new idea. Judgment hinders imagination.").
107. Based on a review of "videotaped and transcribed law student-client and at-
torney-client first interviews," for instance, Professor Gay Gellhorn concluded that
"clients reveal critical self-information in their opening words, regardless of when
those words occur and regardless of the legal interviewer's role in eliciting them. This
information usually is not acknowledged by legal interviewers, with negative conse-
quences. Failure to hear and see affects the legal interviewer's ability to form a rela-
tionship with a client, to comprehend the full range of information the client needs to
share, and to collaborate with the client to tell a story in legally and emotionally effec-
tive language." Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language: An Empirically-Based Model for
the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 321, 321 (1998) (foot-
note omitted).
108. Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 44.
109. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
110. Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 45.
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and Love recognize that most lawyers are disinclined to mediate in a
facilitative way. "Lawyers like most people feel more comfortable
with what they know best," Kovach and Love acknowledge. 111 When
functioning as mediators, "they revert to their default adversarial
mode, analyzing the legal merits of the case in order to move towards
settlement."112 Although "many such 'mediators' also have training
in facilitative techniques, case evaluation dominates their
practice."113
Despite widespread recognition that lawyers are not likely to be
drawn to, and skilled at, facilitative mediation, many in the media-
tion community would argue that those few lawyers capable of purely
facilitative behavior are the very lawyers that gravitate toward medi-
ation. But even if a subset of lawyers is capable of mediating in a
purely facilitative, non-evaluative way-and it seems likely that such
a subset exists-the mediation process is still unlikely to be a truly
facilitative one because disputants are likely to perceive facilitative
behavior on the part of lawyer-mediators differently than they per-
ceive facilitative behavior on the part of non-lawyer-mediators. Dis-
putants, in short, are likely to see the world through a "standard
perceptual map" that predisposes them to perceive lawyers as
evaluators.
Although we do not possess a wealth of empirical evidence about
the disputant's perceptual map, what we do know from that evidence,
and what we can reasonably infer, suggests that disputants are likely
to see and hear lawyer-mediators differently than non-lawyer-
mediators. In short, disputants are likely to perceive lawyer-
111. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 96.
112. Id. at 94.
113. Id; see also Jonathan M. Hyman, Slip-Sliding Into Mediation: Can Lawyers
Mediate Their Clients' Problems?, 5 CNIcAL L. REv. 47, 87 (1998) ("Many lawyers
will feel most comfortable with a narrow, evaluative approach to mediation.); Kovach
& Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 6, at 96 ("Lawyers customarily speak for
their clients and present adversarial arguments about the merits of the case. Accord-
ingly, they attempt to draw mediation back into their adversarial paradigm"); id. at
105 (arguing that the exclusion of non-lawyer mediators pulls "mediation back to-
wards the adversarial norm"); Love, Top Ten Reasons, supra note 8, at 942 (arguing
that "if the field is theirs, lawyer-mediators will likely pull mediation into an adver-
sarial paradigm"); Paul J. Spiegelman, Certifying Mediators: Using Selection Criteria
to Include the Qualified-Lessons from the San Diego Experience, 30 U.S.F. L. Rnv.
677, 693 (1996) ("Restricting the practice of mediation to lawyers or other profession-
als could deprive mediation of its nonadversarial approach, potentially transforming
it into the type of legalistic process to which it is supposed to be an alternative.).
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mediators as legal experts who possess "hard" personalities and ques-
tionable ethics. These perceptions, in turn, are likely to render medi-
ation evaluative, at least from the perspective of the disputants.
114
1. Lawyers as Legal Experts
From the first year of law school to the final days of law practice,
lawyers are likely to find that non-lawyers perceive them as profes-
sionals to whom they should defer because of their perceived intelli-
gence and substantive expertise in innumerable legal areas. Law
students routinely report receiving questions like the following from
family and friends: "How much can I get from Bob in the divorce?" "If
a cop stops me for speeding, does he have the right to search under
my seat?" "Your uncle and I have never had a will. Would you pre-
pare one for us?" Similarly, practicing lawyers routinely receive
questions from clients about areas of the law with which they are
wholly unfamiliar. When a client hires a divorce lawyer, for example,
he is likely to assume that he can also get expert advice from the
lawyer on estate planning, criminal matters, or workers' compensa-
tion issues. Although laypersons seem generally aware that doctors
have limited subject matter expertise-e.g., most adult males realize
they should not consult an OB/GYN or a pediatrician if they are hav-
ing stomach problems-they often overestimate the breadth of law-
yers' knowledge and expertise.
What systematic empirical evidence there is supports the anec-
dotal experiences of most law students and lawyers. In the early
1990s, for instance, the ABA commissioned Peter D. Hart Research
Associates "to conduct a comprehensive survey of the public's view of
the [legal] profession."115 The researchers found, among other
things, that "[niearly two-thirds of the public view lawyers as smart
and knowledgeable."11 6 When "[aisked whether or not various quali-
ties described lawyers," in fact, "the strongest positive responses were
that lawyers were smart and knowledgeable and know how to solve
114. This argument rests on the assumption that the mediator will disclose his or
her professional background to the disputants either prior to, or at the outset of, the
mediation. It may, in fact, be the case that some mediators in some mediation pro-
grams may not disclose that they are trained as lawyers. See Riskin, Philosophical
Map, supra note 14, at 36 (reporting that lawyer-mediators in the Houston Neighbor-
hood Justice Center in the early 1980s were "enjoined not to give legal advice, and
they generally do not let disputants know that they are lawyers"). Nevertheless, most
in the mediation community seem to assume that mediators will disclose their back-
grounds as lawyers to the parties prior to, or at the outset of, the mediation (or that
their backgrounds will be disclosed by the courts that refer cases to mediation).
115. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi, 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (1993).
116. Id. at 61.
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problems."117 The public, in short, "perceive[s] lawyers as smart,
knowledgeable, and competent problem solvers in civil disputes." 18
Disputants' perceptions of lawyers as intelligent and knowledge-
able professionals may give lawyer-mediators credibility with dispu-
tants that non-lawyer-mediators do not have. 119  Assuming
disputants believe their disputes have a legal dimension, they may,
for instance, appreciate having a mediator with legal expertise medi-
ating their dispute. On the other hand, disputants may overestimate
lawyers' legal knowledge and understanding of legal processes. This,
in turn, may cause them to interpret facilitative comments and ques-
tions from lawyer-mediators differently than from non-lawyer-
mediators, imputing legal opinions to members of the former group
but not to members of the latter.
2. Lawyers as Gladiators
Lawyers are also likely to find that non-lawyers perceive them as
verbal gladiators who possess "hard" personality traits consistent
with the gladiator image.' 20 The available empirical evidence sug-
gests that non-lawyers perceive lawyers as dominant and aggressive
professionals who are lacking in caring and compassion.
117. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opin-
ion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CN. L. Rv. 805, 809-10 (1998); see also
Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 ("As for
confidence in lawyers' abilities [in a National Law Journal-sponsored survey], 64 per-
cent [of the general public] said they either were 'very certain' or 'somewhat certain'
that if they hired an attorney, he or she would perform competently.").
118. Hengstler, supra note 115, at 64.
119. See, e.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Book Review, 14 OHIO ST. J. o, Disp. REsOL
259, 264 (1998) (reviewing DWiGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTV
STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS (1996)) (arguing that mediators should be
lawyers in "legal mediation" to "elicit the confidence of advocates").
120. See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWER:
LAwYERS ROLE AND LAVYERS' ETHICS 83, 89 (David Luban ed., 1983) ("Litigation is
commonly referred to as a war, or more often as a battle. The other battle metaphors
flow from this premise. For example, some refer to the roles that trial lawyers play in
this war. They can be heroes, hired guns, gladiators, warriors, champions, generals,
lone gunfighters, or the man on the firing line."); Annetee J. Scieszinski, Return of the
Problem-Solvers, 81 A.B.A. J. 119, 119 (1995) ("The media, which for better or worse
educates the public about the role of the lawyer, paints a gladiator who will end up
either the conqueror or the conquered."); Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Prob-
lem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal
Profession, 4 DuKE J. GENDER L. & Poi'Y. 119, 121-22 (1997) ("[The] 'gladiator' model
of legal education and lawyering celebrates analytical rigor, toughness, and quick
thinking. It defines successful performance as fighting to win: an argument, a con-
ffict, or a case. Even in more informal settings such as negotiations or in-house advis-
ing, lawyering often proceeds within the gladiator model.").
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Researchers using the Revised Interpersonal Adjective Scales
(IAS-R), for instance, attempted to assess how subjects rate lawyers
and other professionals on the "dominance" scale. 121 "Dominant" in-
dividuals are "forceful, assertive, dominant and self-confident"' 22 and
are inclined to "direct, persuade, advise, control, influence, organize
and supervise.' 23 Preferring "the roles of leader, chairman, execu-
tive, official and arbiter,"124 dominant individuals "actively take
charge, make decisions, and win arguments.' 25 Researchers found
that subjects rated lawyers very high on the "dominance" scale, 126
more than three times as high as they rated the second-place profes-
sion.127 Conversely, survey evidence demonstrates that non-lawyers
rate lawyers quite low in compassion and caring. In the ABA-spon-
sored Hart survey,12s for instance, researchers found that "[t]he ma-
jority view is that, compared to lawyers in the past, today's attorney
is less caring and compassionate." 129 In fact, "[flewer than one in five
felt the phrase 'caring and compassionate' describes lawyers, as con-
trasted to nearly half (46 percent) who said the phrase does not
apply.' 3
0
It is conceivable that disputants' perceptions of lawyers as gladi-
ators might serve lawyer-mediators well in facilitative mediation.
For instance, disputants might perceive lawyer-mediators as "strong"
and objective neutrals likely to guide them to an efficient resolution.
121. Heather M. McLean & Rudolf Kalin, Congruence Between Self-Image and Oc-
cupational Stereotypes in Students Entering Gender-Dominated Occupations, 26 CA.
NADLAN J. BEHAVioURAL SC. 142, 148 (1994). In addition to lawyers, the study
subjects assessed the personalities of engineers, physicians, nurses, rehabilitation
therapists, and teachers. Id.
122. Jerry S. Wiggins & Ross Broughton, The Interpersonal Circle: A Structural
Model for the Integration of Personality Research, 1 PERSPECTIVES IN PERSONALITY 1,
42 (Robert Hogan & Warren H. Jones eds. 1985). See also Jerry S. Wiggins, A Psycho-
logical Taxonomy of Trait-Descriptive Terms: The Interpersonal Domain, 37 J. PERs.
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 395, 405 (1979) (explaining that "dominance" is an "interpersonal
trait" comprised of the following adjectives: dominant, assertive, forceful, domineer-
ing, firm, self-confident, self-assured, un-self-conscious).
123. Wiggins & Broughton, supra note 122, at 21.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 42.
126. McLean & Kalin, supra note 121, at 151 ("Higher dominance scores were
clearly evident for the occupation lawyer than for the other occupations.").
127. Id. at 152 (showing a mean score for lawyers above .75 and a mean score for
engineers, the second-highest-scoring profession, below .25).
128. See supra text accompanying note 115.
129. Hengstler, supra note 115, at 62.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, disputants' views of lawyer-mediators as gladia-
tors seems likely to undermine the lawyer-mediators' efforts to medi-
ate in a purely facilitative, non-evaluative way. Because disputants
are likely to view lawyer-mediators as dominant, aggressive, and un-
caring, disputants may be hesitant to open up to lawyer-mediators in
the same way they would open up to psychotherapist-mediators or
social worker-mediators. They may expect lawyer-mediators to be
uninterested in, and inattentive to, emotional considerations present
in the dispute, and they may be inclined to grant undue deference to
lawyer-mediators because of their perceived "take charge"
personalities.
3. Lawyers as Deceivers
Jokes targeting lawyers' perceived dishonesty-e.g., "How do you
know when a lawyer is lying? When his lips are moving"13 1-are
among the most common of lawyer jokes and reflect a widespread
public sentiment that lawyers are dishonest and unethical. The sur-
vey data on this score are voluminous. Since 1976,132 for instance, no
more than 25 percent of the population at any one time has rated
lawyers "high" or "very high" in "honesty and ethical standards" in
Gallup polls. 133 Consider, for example, a 1995 Gallup poll, in which a
mere 16 percent of those surveyed rated lawyers' ethical standards
"high" or "very high," placing lawyers seventeenth (tied) out of twenty
six professions. 13 4 Or consider a 1996 Gallup poll, in which 18 per-
cent of those surveyed rated lawyers' ethical standards as "high" or
"very high,"135 ranking lawyers below pharmacists, clergy, college
teachers, medical doctors, dentists, engineers, police, funeral direc-
tors, bankers, public-opinion pollsters, journalists, TV reporters,
131. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 W.t. & MARY L. RE,.
283, 286 (1998).
132. While I rely on survey data from 1976 to the present, I do not in any way
mean to imply that the public's view of lawyers has been unusually low during the
last quarter of the twentieth century. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that law-
yers were held in even lower regard earlier in the century. See Galanter, supra note
117, at 810 ("In reading the polls' story of declining regard for lawyers, we should be
wary of assuming that opinion about the legal profession has fallen from its normal
plane of respect to a historic low. This 'historic low' reading comports vith the scena-
rio, favored by many lawyers, in which the profession has fallen from an earlier state
of grace into an abject and debased condition. Public estimation of lawyers was far
lower at earlier points in American history.").
133. Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Laun-ers First?: In-
skier and Outside Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. J. L. & PVB. Poi'Y 835, 852
t.6 (1997) (citing to the Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, December 9-11, 1996).
134. Id. at 852 t.6.
135. Id.
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building contractors, and local officeholders. 13 6 In short, "according
to Gallup polls, majorities of Americans consistently give pharma-
cists, members of the clergy, dentists, and doctors high ratings for
honesty and ethics, yet no more than 27 percent of Americans sur-
veyed since 1976 rate lawyers as highly ethical."137
Disputants' perceptions of lawyers as dishonest and unethical
cannot possibly aid lawyer-mediators in mediation unless it makes it
easier for lawyer-mediators than for non-lawyer-mediators to exceed
deflated expectations on the part of the disputants. 138 It seems much
more likely, however, that this perception will be harmful to lawyer-
mediators in mediation. Because disputants are likely to enter medi-
ation with fairly low opinions of lawyer-mediators' honesty and ethi-
cal standards, disputants are more likely to be skeptical of the
neutrality and impartiality of lawyer-mediators than non-lawyer-
mediators.
136. Id. at 853 t.7. Lawyers, who placed 15th on the list of 26 professions, ranked
ahead of newspaper reporters, business executives, labor union leaders, real estate
agents, stockbrokers, senators, congressmen, state officeholders, insurance salesmen,
advertising practitioners, and car salesmen. Id. Psychologists, psychotherapists,
counselors, and social workers, among others, were not included in the survey.
137. Id. at 851. Black and Rothman report other survey data demonstrating that
members of the public have a low opinion of lawyers' honesty and ethical standards.
They report data from the 1995 American Family Values Survey showing that few
people think lawyers are good role models. Id. at 854 (citing to Michaels Opinion
Research, American Family Values Survey 1995, Aug. 9-26, 1995) ("Only two percent
of respondents considered lawyers excellent role models, but 78 percent of those sur-
veyed classified lawyers as fair or poor role models. Moreover, lawyers ranked elev-
enth out of fifteen comparison groups included in the survey, receiving lower ratings
than athletes, journalists, and radio announcers."). They report data from a 1987
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman survey in which only 35 percent of respondents indi-
cated that they perceive lawyers to have "high ethical standards." Id. at 854-55 (cit-
ing to Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, Time/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman Poll, Jan. 19-
21, 1987). Additionally, they report data from the Hart and Teeter Research Compa-
nies finding that "18 percent of respondents gave lawyers high or very high rankings
[of their ethical standards], and 41 percent said lawyers have low or very low ethical
standards." Id. at 855 (citing to Hart and Teeter Research Companies, NBC News!
Wall Street Journal Poll, Oct. 27-31, 1995). See also Hengstler, supra note 115, at 62
(reporting that the ABA-commissioned Hart survey found that "barely one in five (22
percent) said the phrase honest and ethical' describes lawyers. Nearly twice as many
(40 percent) said this description does not apply."); James Podgers, Message Bearers
Wanted, 85 A.B.A. J. 89, 89 (1999) (reporting that only 14 percent of respondents in a
1998 ABA-sponsored survey by M/A/R/C Research gave lawyers a "high confidence"
rating).
138. See, e.g., Guthrie & Levin, supra note 40, at 888-89 (asserting that "[a] party
is likely to report high levels of satisfaction with mediation if it meets or exceeds her
prior expectations.").
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4. Summary
Disputants are likely to view lawyer-mediators as legal experts
possessing more comprehensive knowledge than they in fact possess,
as adversarial types endowed with "hard" personalities, and as advo-
cates uninhibited by stringent ethical standards. 139 Because of this
standard perceptual map, disputants are unlikely to experience the
mediation process as a purely facilitative one, even if the lawyer-
mediators exhibit purely facilitative behaviors.
It is possible, of course, that disputants perceive lawyers and
lawyer-mediators differently. There is evidence, for instance, that
the public believes judges are more ethical than lawyers, and perhaps
lawyer-mediators are viewed more like "judges" than "lawyers."
There is evidence suggesting that non-lawyers who hire lawyers view
them more favorably than they view lawyers generally,140 and per-
haps disputants perceive lawyer-mediators the same way they per-
ceive their own counsel. There is also evidence suggesting that
disputants who have completed mediation rate mediators, at least
some of whom were lawyers, quite favorably. 14 1 But even if dispu-
tants perceive lawyers more favorably when they occupy the role of
mediator, disputants' perceptions of lawyer-mediators are inevitably
going to be informed by their perceptions of lawyers generally.
C. Mediation Hypothetical
The empirical evidence on lawyers and non-lawyers' perceptions
of lawyers suggests that mediation is unlikely to be purely facilitative
as long as lawyers serve as mediators. While the empirical evidence
is compelling, some may find a mediation anecdote more insightful
than any compilation of studies and statistics. 14 2 Consider, then, the
following mediation hypothetical:
139. See supra Section II.B.1-3.
140. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 117, at 808 (reporting based on several surveys
that "[o]ver half of American adults have used lawyers and most report themselves
satisfied with the service provided"). But see Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57,
at 552 (contending that the ABA's 1993 poll "debunked the idea that people hate law-
yers in general but like their own").
141. For a recent compilation of the research on party satisfaction, see Guthrie &
Levin, supra note 40.
142. See, e.g., Don Peters, Oiling Rusty Wheels: A Small Claims Mediation Narra-
tive, 50 FLA. L. REV. 761, 761-62 (1998) ("Stories help people learn. They foster under-
standing of complicated interactions. They help make sense of multi-layered
processes by showing how disparate elements come together creating integrated ac-
tion sequences.").
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Suppose that a plaintiff named Patty, who has slipped and fallen
in the Mom-and-Pop Grocery Store, agrees to mediate her claim
against David, the proprietor of that store. Suppose, further, that
this mediation progresses in expected fashion, 143 passing through the
following four stages before the parties succeed (or not) in resolving
their dispute: (1) introduction; (2) opening statements; (3) informa-
tion gathering; and (4) assisted negotiation.
1. Introduction
The mediation process typically begins with mediator introduc-
tions.144 Suppose the lawyer-mediator begins this hypothetical medi-
ation as follows:
Good afternoon. My name is Greg Lopez. I have been asked by
the court to attempt to mediate your dispute. I have not met
either of you before, so I'd like to begin by introducing myself. I
am a lawyer with 10 years of experience representing clients in
lawsuits, but I am here today as a mediator, not as a lawyer. My
role is to learn about the matters that have brought you here
and to aid you in developing solutions that will be acceptable to
each of you.
Now suppose the mediator is a non-lawyer who begins the medi-
ation as follows:
143. While there is no such thing as a "typical" mediation, most academics and
practitioners characterize the process similar to the way I have characterized it. See,
e.g., MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 25 (1996)
(identifying intake, contracting, information gathering and issue identification,
agenda setting, resolving each issue, reaching agreement, and drafting the agreement
as stages of mediation); JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 15 (1996) ("Classical
mediation consists of eight stages: (1) initiation, (2) preparation, (3) introduction, (4)
problem statement, (5) problem clarification, (6) generation and evaluation of alterna-
tive(s), (7) selection of alternative(s), and (8) agreement. In a typical mediation,
stages 4, 5, 6, and 7 sometimes overlap or are repeated before the parties reach a
consensus on all issues and conclude a final agreement."); DWIGHT GoLANN, MEDIAT-
ING LEGAL DIsPuTEs: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 62 (1996)
(emphasis in original) (arguing that "mediation usually takes place in two or three
basic stages: the opening session (also commonly referred to as the joint session), pri-
vate caucuses, and less commonly, moderated negotiations"); KOVACH, supra note 22,
at 31 (arguing that the "basic model" of mediation is comprised of nine mandatory
stages-preliminary arrangements, mediator's introduction, opening statements by the
parties, information gathering, issue and interest identification, option generation,
bargaining and negotiation, agreement, and closure-and four optional stages-ventila-
tion, agenda setting, caucus, and reality testing); JOSEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING
CHARGE/MANAGING CONFLICT 58 (1987) (arguing that mediation is comprised of "six
distinct, consecutive segments" which he labels as follows: begin the discussion, accu-
mulate information, develop the agenda and discussion strategies, generate move-
ment, escape to separate sessions, and resolve the dispute).
144. Id.
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Good afternoon. My name is Greg Lopez. I have been asked by
the court to attempt to mediate your dispute. I have not met
either of you before, so I'd like to begin by introducing myself. I
am a psychotherapist with 10 years of experience counseling cli-
ents in individual and group settings, but I am here today as a
mediator, not as a psychotherapist. My role is to learn about the
matters that have brought you here and to aid you in developing
solutions that will be acceptable to each of you.
In each introduction, 14 5 the mediator discloses his background,
explains that he is appearing as a mediator, and explains further
that he intends to facilitate the disputants' negotiations. The only
difference between the two introductions, of course, is that the media-
tor in the former discloses that he is a lawyer, while the mediator in
the latter discloses that he is a therapist. This single difference is
critical, however, because the introduction "sets the stage for the re-
mainder of the mediation."14 6 It is at this introductory stage that the
mediator attempts to establish credibility with the disputants"47 and
control over the process,148 and the disputants, in turn, form their
first impressions of the mediator.
149
With these introductions, the mediators have set very different
stages for the remainder of the mediation because the disputants-
Patty and David-are likely to perceive each of the mediators differ-
ently based on their respective professional affiliations. The dispu-
tants, in short, are likely to perceive the lawyer-mediator as more
knowledgeable about the law and legal processes, more controlling
145. Each introduction is truncated, of course. In a typical mediation, the media-
tor will provide additional information about factors including the process, behavioral
guidelines, and confidentiality. See CHRiSTOPHER W. MooRE, Tim MEDITION PRo.
cEss 20, 194 (2d ed. 1996) (identifying eleven elements that the "opening statement
usually contains").
146. KovAcH, supra note 22, at 32.
147. See, e.g., STtLBERG, supra note 143, at 65 CBeginning effectively is extremely
important. If the mediator is hesitant, rambling, disorganized, or disrespectful, the
parties will not have any confidence that he can help them. If the mediator presents
himself as a person who is confident, articulate, and decisive, the parties instinctively
will trust him.").
148. See, e.g., CooLEY, supra note 143, at 16 (noting that in the introductory stage
of the mediation the mediator, among other things, "establishes control of the
process").
149. It is possible, of course, that the disputants may have met the mediator prior
to the onset of the mediation session, in which case they will obviously have formed
first impressions of the mediator prior to the mediation session.
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and less compassionate, and less honest than the non-lawyer-media-
tor.150 These perceptions may, as noted above, imbue the lawyer-me-
diator with some credibility that the non-lawyer-mediator does not
possess.151 It seems likely, however, that the disputants' perceptions
of the members of each profession will increase the chances that the
disputants will perceive the former mediator as relatively more eval-
uative, and relatively less facilitative, than the latter.
Indeed, some proponents of facilitative mediation object to
mediators identifying their professional affiliation. 152 This reaction
to the disclosure of the mediator's professional background suggests
that these scholars may share my view that disputants' perceptions
of the mediator and mediation process are likely to be colored if they
learn the mediator is a lawyer.
2. Opening Statements
Following introductions, the mediator typically invites each
party to make an opening statement. "The opening statement stage,"
Kovach explains, "is the time for parties to fully express and explain
to the mediator, and, more importantly, to each other, in their own
words, how they view the dispute."153 Suppose Patty, the plaintiff in
this dispute, makes the following opening statement:
After church on Sunday, I went to the Mom-and-Pop Grocery
Store to buy groceries for the week. I started down the fresh
fruit aisle, when I heard my friend Lula, who sings in the
church choir with me, shout at me from behind. I started to
turn back to talk to her, and as I did, my heel slipped on a grape
peel on the floor. I fell down and broke my arm and my jaw as I
landed. Also, my dress caught on my shopping cart and ripped
off, so I was left nearly naked on the floor. One of the store em-
ployees pointed and laughed at me. Another employee came
over and tried to help me up.' 54
Consider the manner in which the lawyer-mediator and the non-
lawyer-mediator are likely to "hear" Patty's story. Employing his
well-honed analytical skills, the lawyer-mediator is likely to skillfully
translate Patty's story into a legally cognizable one, identifying
causes of action (e.g., negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
distress), elements which must be established to make out each cause
150. See supra Section II.B.
151. See supra Section II.B.
152. See supra note 114.
153. KOVACH, supra note 22, at 32.
154. The "facts" of this hypothetical are based loosely on the facts of a hypothetical
contained in KOVACH, supra note 22, at 257.
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of action (e.g., breach of duty, outrageous conduct), prospective de-
fendants (e.g., grocery store, "laughing" employee), key issues (e.g.,
constructive notice), witnesses (e.g., "laughing" employee, "helping"
employee, Lula), damage items (e.g., medical expenses, lost wages,
pain and suffering), and affirmative defenses (e.g., comparative
fault).
The non-lawyer-mediator may also have a sense of the legal
claims relevant to the dispute, but the non-lawyer-mediator-partic-
ularly if she is a psychotherapist or social worker-is more likely
than the lawyer-mediator to be attentive to the emotional, non-mate-
rial considerations present in the dispute. She is likely to wonder not
only about the legal claims, in other words, but also about the impact
of the broken jaw on plaintiff's singing in the choir, the embarrass-
ment she suffered as a consequence of lying naked on the floor, the
reactions of the employees to her fall, etc. Rather than internally
translating all of plaintiffs claims into money damages, 15 5 the non-
lawyer-mediator is more likely than the lawyer-mediator to be cogni-
zant of non-monetary considerations that might be important to the
plaintiff, like an apology from the "laughing" employee. 16
155. See, e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 113, at 695 (arguing that "requiring
mediators to be lawyers ... risks placing too heavy an emphasis on reducing disputes
to a dollar figure at the expense of creatively exploring options.").
156. Consider Professor Kenney Hegland's oft-repeated anecdote:
In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we had
recently studied. I put the following:
In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to deliver widgets
at the rate of 1000 a month. The first two deliveries are perfect. However, in
the third month Seller delivers only 999 widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed
with this that he rejects the delivery, cancels the remaining deliveries and
refuses to pay for the widgets already delivered. After stating the problem, I
asked 'If you were Seller, what would you say?' What I was looking for was a
discussion of the various common law theories which would force the buyer to
pay for the widgets delivered and those which would throw buyer into breach
for canceling the remaining deliveries. In short, I wanted the class to come
up with the legal doctrines which would allow Seller to crush Buyer.
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer. As is so
often the case with first year students, I found that they were all either writ-
ing in their notebooks or inspecting their shoes. There was, however, one
eager face, that of an eight year old son of one of my students. It seems that
he was suffering through Contracts due to his mother's sin of failing to find a
sitter. Suddenly he raised his hand. Such behavior, even from an eight year
old, must be rewarded.
'OK,' I said, 'What would you say if you were the seller?'
Td say Tm sorry.'
Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting from Kenney Hegland, Why
Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay on Never Ask Why, in Hurm.usric Etuc. IN Lmw,
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3. Information Gathering
Given their initial interpretations of Patty's story (as well as
David's), the mediators are likely to go about their next task'
57-
gathering additional information-in slightly different ways. The
lawyer-mediator will be more inclined to ask questions designed to
elicit the legally relevant information about the dispute, while the
non-lawyer-mediator will be more inclined to ask questions designed
to elicit information about all aspects of the dispute, not merely those
that are legally relevant. Even if both mediators go about gathering
additional information in the same, facilitative way, Patty and David
are likely to hear each mediator's open, closed, and reality-testing
questions a little differently:
To gather general information about the dispute, the mediator
will begin by asking "open" or "open-ended" questions, which are de-
signed to elicit "the broadest possible answer[s]. "158 In the dispute
between Patty and David, the mediator might ask Patty such open-
ended questions as: "What else can you tell me about your fall?" or
"How did you feel when the accident happened?" or "What do you
want from David?"
Closed questions, by contrast, call for less elaborate, more fo-
cused answers. Closed questions may take a number of forms, in-
cluding requests for clarification, leading questions, and yes/no
questions.' 59 In the dispute between Patty and David, the mediator
might ask Patty such closed questions as: "Have you had any prior
injuries to your arm or jaw?" or 'What problems has this accident
caused your family?"
Reality-testing questions, which may be open or closed, challenge
the respondent to consider the strengths and weaknesses of her story
or claims. 160 Consider the following reality-testing questions that
the mediator might ask Patty in this case: "What do you think the
jury will make of the fact that you were looking back at Lula when
you fell?" or "Given that he did not yet realize that you had seriously
Monograph III, at 68-69 (1982)). For more on apology, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Advis-
ing Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999).
157. See, e.g., KovAcH, supra note 22, at 115 ("Information gathering is a signifi-
cant stage of mediation and should not be overlooked or hurried through. Once par-
ties begin to focus on issues and options for settlement, they become reluctant to
share additional information. They stop listening, and become entrenched in posi-
tions. Therefore, the information exchange must occur early in the session.").
158. Id. at 117.
159. Id. at 117-18.
160. See, e.g., id. at 33 (describing "reality testing" as "checking out with each side
the realistic possibility of attaining what he or she is hoping for").
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hurt yourself, do you think the jury will find the employee's laughter
outrageous?"
Upon hearing these facilitative questions, Patty and David are
likely to perceive them differently depending upon whether the medi-
ator is a lawyer or non-lawyer. When a lawyer-mediator asks an
open question like, "How did you feel when the accident happened?",
a closed question like, "What problems has this caused your family?",
or a reality-testing question like, "What do you think the jury will
make of the fact that you were looking back at Lula when you fell?",
disputants like Patty and David will assume he is inquiring about,
and subtly opining on, legally relevant aspects of the dispute. This
assumption, in turn, will influence the information they disclose (and
withhold) and will increase the likelihood that the mediation will be
adversarial and evaluative.
4. Assisted Negotiation
After introducing himself and the mediation process, and after
eliciting information through opening statements and follow-up ques-
tioning, the mediator focuses on facilitating negotiation between the
parties. The mediator is likely to begin by identifying the issues to be
addressed in the mediation. In so doing, the mediator strives to
"identify negotiating issues precisely"16 1 and in 'language that is
nonjudgmental.
"162
The lawyer-mediator, accustomed to translating client stories
into legally cognizable claims and causes of action, is likely to identify
the negotiating issues in legalistic terms: e.g., "whether defendant
was negligent," "whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent,"
"whether defendant's employee engaged in outrageous conduct." The
non-lawyer-mediator, who is probably unfamiliar with the law of neg-
ligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, is more likely
to frame the negotiating issues in non-legalistic, nonjudgmental
terms: e .g., "Patty's fall," "the fruit aisle," "customer relations."
Framing the issues in legalistic, adversarial terms is likely to lead to
a legalistic, adversarial mediation, while framing the issues in non-
legalistic, nonjudgmental terms is more likely to result in a facilita-
tive mediation.
Even assuming the lawyer-mediator successfully frames the ne-
gotiation issues in non-legalistic and nonjudgmental terms-e.g.,
"Patty's fall," "the fruit aisle," and "customer relations"--the lawyer-
161. STuLBERG, supra note 143, at 84.
162. Id. at 83.
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mediator is likely to have difficulty behaving in a purely facilitative
way when he then attempts to "move the parties toward generating
ideas, options or alternatives which might resolve the case."1 63
To aid the parties in generating options, the mediator must en-
gage the parties in a period of "divergent" thinking, "during which a
variety of potential solutions are generated before any are critically
evaluated, let alone adopted." 164 In this case, for instance, the medi-
ator might aid Patty and David in considering any or all of the follow-
ing options: money damages, store credit, store coupons, termination
of the laughing employee, apology by the laughing employee, new
store policies regarding fruit aisle clean-up, posting of warning signs
in the fruit aisle, etc. This process requires "[i]magination and crea-
tivity,"165 yet, as Dean Paul Brest and Professor Linda Krieger recog-
nize, "'creative' is not the first adjective that comes to mind when
people think of lawyers. We [lawyers] are viewed-perhaps by our-
selves as well as by others-as conservative, risk-averse, precedent-
bound, and wedded to a narrow, legalistic range of problem solving
strategies." 166 Brest and Krieger concede that "[tihere may be sub-
stance to this view,"1 67 and indeed, the empirical evidence described
above paints a picture of lawyers as rigidly analytical or "convergent"
in their thinking,' 68 which calls into question the lawyer-mediator's
ability to perform the critical facilitative task of option generation.
Because of the difficulty the lawyer-mediator may have assisting
the parties in generating options and ideas, the lawyer-mediator
may, during this stage of mediation, "meet privately with each
party"169 in caucus. 170 The caucus "enables the parties and the medi-
ator to be more direct."1 7 The mediator may "take[] a more active
role in prompting options,"172 urge the parties "to take a realistic look
163. KOVACH, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that the mediator engages in option
generation "[o]nce the mediator has the issues identified").
164. Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASI.




168. See supra Section II.A.1.
169. KOVACH, supra note 22, at 33.
170. See, e.g., STULBERG, supra note 143, at 107 ("A mediator chooses to meet sepa-
rately with the parties-to caucus with them-because he believes that doing so will
contribute to the settlement process.").
171. KOVACH, supra note 22, at 165.
172. Id.
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at their objectives,"173 and "educat[e] the parties about the negotiat-
ing process."174 Given the more active and direct role the mediator is
likely to play in caucus, it seems even more likely in caucus than in
open session that Patty and David will view the lawyer-mediator's
facilitative behavior as more evaluative than the non-lawyer-media-
tor's identical behavior.
5. Summary
At each stage of the mediation, the lawyer-mediator is more
likely than the non-lawyer-mediator to be drawn to evaluative behav-
iors and to have difficulty with facilitative behaviors. And even if a
fraction of lawyer-mediators in a fraction of mediations can sustain
facilitative conduct, disputants like Patty and David are likely to per-
ceive lawyers differently from non-lawyers in ways that preclude the
process from being a purely facilitative, non-evaluative one. It is pos-
sible, of course, to imagine a mediation in which the lawyer mediates
in a purely facilitative way and the disputants perceive the lawyer-
mediator's conduct in a purely facilitative way. Nonetheless, media-
tion, at a bare minimum, is much more likely to be evaluative, and
much less likely to be facilitative, when lawyers serve as mediators.
D. The Lawyer-Mediator's Role
Given that lawyers are unlikely to be able to mediate in a purely
facilitative way, should lawyers be allowed to serve as mediators?
The answer to this question turns on one's view of mediation.
The mediation purists believe that mediation must be a purely
facilitative, non-evaluative process open only to mediators who be-
have in a purely facilitative way. Lawyer-mediators appear not to
have a place at the purists' mediation table. To be sure, the purists
have not advocated a ban on lawyer-mediators. Nonetheless, because
purists are committed to a purely-facilitative process, and because
lawyer-mediators are unlikely to be able to conduct such a process, a
prohibition against lawyer-mediators seems consistent with the pur-
ist view of mediation.Y5
The mediation pluralists, by contrast, believe that mediation
should be open to facilitative and evaluative mediators. "It is too
late," Riskin argues on behalf of the pluralists, "for commentators or
173. Id-
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
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mediation organizations to tell practitioners who are widely recog-
nized as mediators that they are not, in the same sense that it is too
late for the Pizza Association of Naples, Italy to tell Domino's that its
product is not the genuine article." 176 Because the pluralists have
adopted an inclusive view of mediation, the lawyer-mediator does
have a place at the pluralists' mediation table despite the lawyer-me-
diator's proclivity for evaluation.
Like the purists, I believe that mediators should strive to facili-
tate. Unlike the purists, however, I believe, along with the pluralists,
that mediation should be an eclectic process in which different types
of mediators are available to suit different disputants. 177 Some medi-
ated disputes demand a facilitative approach, and in those disputes,
non-lawyer-mediators are likely to be better mediators than lawyer-
mediators. Other mediated disputes call for a relatively more evalua-
tive approach, and in those disputes, lawyer-mediators can use their
evaluative skills-including their analytical acumen, emotional de-
tachment, and legal expertise-to great advantage.178 In all likeli-
hood, most mediated disputes call for some combination of facilitative
and evaluative approaches, and in those disputes, lawyer-mediators
and non-lawyer-mediators each have unique attributes to offer to
disputants.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWYERING
I have argued in this article that lawyers operate according to a
standard philosophical map that predisposes them to practice law
and mediation in an evaluative rather than a facilitative way. The
purpose of this part of the article is to ask-and propose tentative
answers to-three questions. First, should lawyers adopt a different
philosophical map? Recognizing the value of the lawyer's standard
philosophical map, I argue that lawyers should retain-but enrich-
the standard philosophical map. Second, assuming lawyers should
enrich the standard philosophical map, is it possible for them to do
so? The empirical evidence on this point is unclear, but I believe it
176. Riskin, Grid, supra note 1, at 13.
177. The leading proponent of "eclectic mediation" is Professor Stempel. For his
most recent thoughts on this topic, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the
Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 247.
178. It is worth observing that the typical lawyer's discomfort with emotion may
be detrimental in evaluative as well as facilitative mediation. A lawyer-mediator un-
comfortable with emotion may fail to develop rapport with the disputants, neglect a
claimant's emotional harms, ignore the emotional tension between the disputants,
etc. Any of these "failings" on the part of the mediator might undermine even an
evaluative mediation.
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supports the proposition that one socializing institution-law
school-can help enrich the lawyer's standard philosophical map.
Third, assuming law schools can influence the standard philosophical
map, what should law schools do? Acknowledging that there are sig-
nificant impediments to major reform in the legal academy, I make
only one proposal: that law schools and law professors should strive
to teach law students not only to "think like a lawyer" but also to "feel
like a lawyer."
A. Should Lawyers Adopt a Different Philosophical Map?
What philosophical map should guide lawyers? From a norma-
tive perspective, lawyers should adopt whatever philosophical map
induces them to produce the most justice or happiness or other
agreed-upon good for their clients and society. However, the purpose
of this inquiry is not to address the normative question-i.e., the
"should" question with a capital "S'-but rather the prescriptive
question-i.e., the "should" question with a lowercase "S."179 From a
prescriptive perspective, lawyers should adopt whatever philosophi-
cal map enables them to function effectively as lawyers.
Thoughtful people may very well disagree about what it means
to be a good lawyer, but I suspect all would agree that to function at a
high level lawyers need to have the ability to use multiple approaches
to address client problems.180 Good lawyering, in short, demands
flexibility because the tasks that lawyers commonly perform-e.g.,
counseling a client, writing a brief, picking a jury, arguing a motion,
negotiating a deal-require different approaches and demand differ-
ent skills.
The lawyer's standard philosophical map-which advances an
analytical, non-emotional, adversarial orientation to law practice-
reflects an evaluative approach to lawyering. Guided by the stan-
dard map, lawyers are well-equipped to write persuasive legal briefs,
argue pre-trial motions, cross-examine witnesses, and perform other
evaluative tasks. Because the lawyer's standard philosophical map
179. The distinction between "normative" and "prescriptive" is often slippery. See
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STr. L. R,.
1471, 1474 (1998) (observing that "normative analysis is no different from prescrip-
tive analysis" in conventional economics). The basic idea, however, is that normative
refers "more broadly [to] the ends of the legal system" while prescriptive refers more
narrowly to the achievement of specified ends. Id- at 1474.
180. But see Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57, at 590 (acknowledging that
"it may undermine the American legal system to have lawyers change in these ways,
if equal access to justice and lawyer satisfaction depend on rational, objective lawyers
adopting the amoral professional role").
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advances this critically important component of lawyering, lawyers
should certainly not abandon it.
The problem with the lawyer's standard philosophical map is
that it serves only as a partial guide. Most assuredly, the lawyer's
standard philosophical map does help lawyers perform such evalua-
tive tasks as writing briefs and arguing motions, but it provides much
less guidance to 'lawyers called upon to listen to and counsel dis-
tressed clients, negotiate with co-counsel, work with a family to cre-
ate an estate plan, solve a problem in a novel way, and perform other
facilitative tasks. The lawyer's standard philosophical map, in short,
is like any geographic map. Though helpful, geographical maps are
limited because they depict a three-dimensional world in two dimen-
sions. Likewise, the lawyer's standard philosophical map charts a
course appropriate for a two-dimensional world despite the fact that
lawyers inhabit a three-dimensional world which requires them to
approach problems in flexible fashion.
Cartographers have not abandoned two-dimensional maps, but
they have developed globes to more accurately depict the Earth's ge-
ography. Likewise, lawyers should not abandon their standard philo-
sophical map, but they should seek to enrich it so that it more
accurately reflects the skills and approaches that good lawyering de-
mands. Good lawyering requires lawyers to develop evaluative skills,
like analytical reasoning, dispassionate analysis, and "adversarial-
ness." These attributes, in turn, enable lawyers to participate effec-
tively in evaluative processes like trial. Good lawyering also requires
lawyers to develop facilitative skills, like listening, empathizing, and
creative problem-solving. These attributes enable lawyers to effec-
tively interview and counsel clients, negotiate with co-counsel and op-
posing counsel, develop relationships with colleagues, etc. The
lawyer's standard philosophical map facilitates the development of
the former set of attributes, but lawyers need to cultivate something
like a "mediator's philosophical map" to help develop the latter set of
attributes. 181
B. Can Lawyers Adopt a Different Philosophical Map?
Assuming lawyers should enrich the philosophical map that
guides their behavior, can they? The answer to this question depends
on the origins of the lawyer's standard philosophical map. If lawyers
181. Riskin contrasts the lawyer's standard philosophical map with a mediator's
philosophical map in his seminal 1982 article. See Riskin, Philosophical Map, supra
note 14, at 43-44.
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are born with the standard philosophical map-if, in other words,
they are innately analytical, dispassionate, and adversarial in orien-
tation-it seems likely that they will have difficulty embracing other
orientations. If, on the other hand, the lawyer's standard philosophi-
cal map is a product of socialization, education, and training, it seems
likely that those institutions that play a central role in the develop-
ment of lawyers may be able to help lawyers change.
Unfortunately, the evidence on the origins of the lawyer's stan-
dard philosophical map is inconclusive. Most of the available re-
search is designed solely to assess lawyers' and law students'
personality traits, not to determine how or when lawyers developed
those traits. For example, Landwehr's assessment of lawyers' moral
reasoning informs us that lawyers are adversarially oriented, 82 but
it does not tell us how or when lawyers developed that orientation.
Similarly, the MBTI research indicates that lawyers and law stu-
dents are more inclined toward the "thinking" orientation than the
"feeling" orientation,18 3 but it does not tell us where this inclination
originated.' 84 And several researchers have found that lawyers and
law students are competitive and aggressive,185 but they have not
documented the source of these tendencies. Thus, most of the re-
search on lawyer attributes does not identify the source or sources of
the lawyer's standard philosophical map.
There is some evidence to suggest that lawyers have acquired
aspects of the lawyer's standard philosophical map long before begin-
ning their formal legal training. Professor Susan Daicoff, who has
carefully reviewed and summarized the empirical evidence on lawyer
attributes in tvo articles, 8 6 observes that "[e]mpirical research over
the last forty years has established that attorneys differ from the
general population in the United States"'87 and contends that some
attorney attributes appear "before law school, and thus are long-
standing, ingrained personality traits that are likely to be very diffi-
cult to change."' 88 But there is also evidence to suggest that lawyers
182. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
183. See generally sources cited supra note 64.
184. But see Randall, supra note 64, at 91 (finding a strong preference among law
students for the "thinking" orientation at the beginning of their first year of law
school).
185. See generally sources cited supra note 84.
186. See Daicoff, Know Thyself, supra note 57; Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note
57.
187. Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57, at 566.
188. Daicoff, Changing Spots, supra note 57, at 594. One study of pre-law stu-
dents provides support for the claim that some of these lawyer attributes appear to be
present prior to legal training. See Bohn, supra note 84. In this study, Professor
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acquire the standard philosophical map-or that it becomes more
prominent-during law school. For example, Janoff found that law
students became less "caring" during the first year of law school,'8 9
Hedegard found that law students became less sociable and that they
lost interest in other people during the first year of law school, 190 and
Benjamin and his colleagues found that law students experienced ele-
vated levels of mental distress after attending law school. 191
The research evidence is inconclusive, but it suggests that law-
yers acquire the standard philosophical map through some combina-
tion of nature and nurture. Lawyers probably possess attributes
from early in their lives that are consistent with the lawyer's stan-
dard philosophical map, but subsequent life experiences-in particu-
lar, law school-appear to play a critical role in strengthening these
attributes and inculcating others consistent with the lawyer's philo-
sophical map. Most lawyers are probably born with some degree of
analytical acumen, for example, but law school is likely to hone it,
place renewed emphasis on it, and stunt emotional development in
the process. Because law school seems to play such a formative role
in charting the lawyer's standard philosophical map, law school can
probably play a formative role in charting a better map.
C. What Role Should Law Schools Play?
Like many before me 192 (and many after, I suspect), I believe law
schools should strive to enrich the philosophical map that informs the
way lawyers practice law. Because I recognize that law schools are
remarkably resistant to fundamental change, I make only one modest
proposal in this article.
Law schools commonly claim that they teach law students how to
"think like a lawyer." Thinking like a lawyer is important, but law
Martin Bohn found that pre-law undergraduates were more competitive than pre-
med, engineering, and undecided undergraduates. Id. at 361. Pre-law students ap-
peared to have a psychological need "to be a leader, to attract attention, and to avoid
feeling inferior or taking a subordinate role." Id. This study suffers from two signifi-
cant limitations, however. First, Bohn included only male undergraduates in his
study. Id. at 359. Second, there is no way of knowing how many of the undergradu-
ates who identified themselves as "pre-law" actually became lawyers, particularly
given that they appear to have participated in the study as college freshmen. Id.
189. See supra text accompanying note 81. For a different view, see generally
Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student:
Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306 (1981) (finding that the
first year of law school did not affect the moral development of law students).
190. See supra text accompanying note 80.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
192. See, e.g., Coben, supra note 48.
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schools tend to overestimate the importance of analytical skills to the
detriment of emotional insight. I believe that law schools and law
professors can enrich the lawyer's standard philosophical map by en-
couraging law students enrolled in the traditional law school curricu-
lum-particularly the first-year curriculum-not only to think like
lawyers but also to feel like lawyers.
Talk of feelings often gives law professors (as well as law stu-
dents and lawyers) pause. Many law professors are uncomfortable
because they worry that acknowledging the relevance of feelings will
undermine their efforts to teach thinking. This is misguided for two
reasons:
First, law students need to appreciate the important role that
emotion can play in the development of legal doctrine (even if feelings
are often rationalized or described as "policy reasons" in the class-
room). Tort law, for example, is designed not merely to achieve effi-
ciency through appropriate levels of deterrence but also to promote
corrective justice by compensating injured victims. When courts re-
quire tortfeasors to compensate victims, they are motivated not
merely by thoughts of abstract justice but also by feelings of compas-
sion. Emotions are even central to understanding legal doctrine and
behavior in a Corporations or Business Organizations course. Profes-
sor Robert Thompson, a leading corporate scholar, explains that the
students who take his Corporations course learn that it not just "a
class on business and money" but rather a class that "is really about
people and core human emotions." 193 More generally, Professor Su-
san Bandes observes in the introduction to her acclaimed book, The
Passions of Law:
The law.., is imbued with emotion. Not just the obvious emo-
tions like mercy and the desire for vengeance but disgust, ro-
mantic love, bitterness, uneasiness, fear, resentment,
cowardice, vindictiveness, forgiveness, contempt, remorse, sym-
pathy, hatred, spite, malice, shame, respect, moral fervor, and
the passion for justice. Emotion pervades not just the criminal
courts, with their heat-of-passion and insanity defenses and
their angry or compassionate jurors but the civil courtrooms, the
appellate courtrooms, the legislatures. It propels judges and
lawyers, as well as jurors, litigants, and the lay public.19 4
Second, and more significantly, lawyers represent clients. Cli-
ents come to lawyers with problems about which they often have deep
193. Jane Salem, Devil's Advocate, 30 VANDERBILT LA VYER 25, 25 (2000).
194. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PAssIoNs OF L.,w 2 (Susan A. Bandes
ed. 1999).
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feelings, including sadness, fear, embarrassment, anger, and ven-
geance. Law students might think that feelings play an important
role only in domestic disputes or criminal law, but the fact is that
clients embroiled in disputes over employment rights, the use of in-
tellectual property, alleged breaches of commercial contracts, or al-
most any topic experience a range of emotions that good lawyers
identify, and if appropriate, help their clients voice. Good lawyers, in
short, must (and inevitably, do) both think and feel for their clients.
It is one thing, of course, to urge law schools and law professors
to teach their students to embrace the emotive aspects of law and
lawyering in the classroom. It is another thing altogether to facili-
tate this. Nonetheless, I offer the following three suggestions.
One way law professors can embrace the emotive aspects of law
is by expanding the conventional classroom dialogue. Law professors
can inquire not only about the legally relevant facts, the issues
presented, and the holding of a case, but also about the emotive as-
pects of a case. What do you think the plaintiff wanted? How did the
plaintiff feel after incurring the injury? How did the defendant feel
when the plaintiff accused him of carelessness? What options did the
lawyers have for helping their respective clients address the dispute
between them?
Law professors can also enrich their classes by assigning-and
then discussing--"case-study" materials that provide more detailed
information about the participants in disputes. In a Torts class, for
example, professors might assign The Passengers of Palsgraf95 (a
book chapter providing details about the lives of some of the people
involved in the famous Palsgraf case), A CMIL ACTION 196 (a book
describing a toxic tort case primarily from the perspective of the
plaintiffs counsel) or DAMAGES 19 7 (a book describing a medical mal-
practice case involving a severely compromised baby told from the
perspective of the plaintiffs, the defendants, and their counsel). Law
students are more likely to empathize with disputants if they read
about them through case-study materials than if their only exposure
to the disputants is through the arid recitations of "facts" typical of
most appellate cases.
Third, law professors might enrich their law school courses by
including some experiential exercises which can be conducted inside
195. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111-51 (1976).
196. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
197. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF
MEDICINE (1998).
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or outside the classroom. In their pioneering work at the University
of Missouri, for example, Professors Riskin and Westbrook have de-
vised-with the help of scholars from around the country-a supple-
mental first-year curriculum designed to inculcate in students a
broader conception of what it means to be a lawyer. 98 The center-
piece of the supplementary curriculum is a set of dispute resolution
exercises in which students conduct simulations designed to help
them "try on" the role of lawyer or disputant in client counseling, ne-
gotiation, mediation, arbitration, and the like. 199 Research evidence
suggests that the so-called Missouri plan has succeeded in inculcat-
ing in its students a broader conception of the lawyer.200
Through these and other innovations in the standard curricu-
lum, as well as through the teaching of lawyering and dispute resolu-
tion courses that give primacy to empathy, listening, and the like,
law schools may be able to enrich the philosophical maps that guide
at least some of their students.
CONCLUSION
Riskin's grid has engendered a robust debate on the practice of
mediation. Thoughtful scholars have argued on the one hand that
there is no such thing as purely facilitative mediation201 and on the
other hand that it is the only kind of mediation. 20 2 By comparison, I
have made the rather modest claim that lawyer-mediators compro-
mise facilitative mediation because of the way they tend to be and the
way disputants tend to perceive them. Because I embrace an eclectic
view of mediation, I am not troubled by the implications of my argu-
ment for the practice of mediation. I am troubled, however, by the
implications of my argument for the practice of law. In my view, law
198. See Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Integrating Dispute Resolution
Into Standard First-Year Law School Courses: The Missouri Plan, 39 J. LEAL. EDuc.
509, 509-14 (1998).
199. See LEONARD L. RismN ET AL., INSTRUCTOR'S MALNuAL vaTH SIULATION AND
PROBLEM MATERIALS TO AccoMPANY RIsKIN & WESTBROOK DISPLrrE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS (2d ed. 1998).
200. See Ronald M. Pipkin, Teaching Dispute Resolution in the First Year of Law
School: An Evaluation of the Program at the University of Missouri-Columbia, 50 FL"
L. REv. 609, 626-30 (1998).
201. See Stempel, supra note 177; see also Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilita-
tion: Moving Past EitherlOr, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 309, 310 (arguing that "there is no
such thing as a purely facilitative mediation of a legal dispute").
202. See supra Part II. See generally John Lande, Toward More Sophisticated Afe-
diation Theory, 2000 J. DLsp. REsOL. 321,327 (noting that the debate has been fruitful
but often characterized by "rigid, orthodox, extremist, narrow, purist, dogmatic, emo-
tional, strident, and even just plain irritating" arguments) (footnotes omitted).
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schools can, and should, attempt to enrich students' views of lawyer-
ing. In law school, students should begin to learn what it means to be
a lawyer, not merely what it means to think like one.
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